This paper examines the importance of fiscal autonomy in the analysis of decentralization. Using new data published by the OECD (2001, 2002), it reproduces several indicators and proposes new measures of decentralization that take into consideration subnational governments' autonomy over their revenues. Two models are reproduced: Davoodi and Zou (1998) on decentralization and economic growth, and
Introduction
A number of studies evaluate the impacts of decentralization on economic growth and public sector size (Davoodi and Zou, 1998; Akai and Sakata, 2002; Oates, 1985; Ehdaie, 1994; and Jin and Zou, 2002) . Most of them use the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) of the International Monetary Fund to measure decentralization (the only crosscountry data available then). Unfortunately, GFS indicators do not include information on the level of autonomy of subnational governments in terms of their revenues or expenditures, which is important information when analyzing decentralization.
The OECD has recently published surveys on the fiscal design of 10 European transition countries (OECD 2001 (OECD , 2002 . OECD data allow users to compute indicators of fiscal decentralization that take into consideration the fiscal autonomy of subnational governments. It is then possible to evaluate whether fiscal autonomy affects the relation between decentralization and economic outcomes. Ebel and Yilmaz (2002) 
I -Decentralization and the empirical work
The "what" and "why" of decentralization There is no right or unique definition of fiscal decentralization. It encompasses the three related processes of "devolution", "delegation" and "deconcentration" (Bird, 2001; Bird and Vaillancourt, 1998; Litvak and al., 1998; and Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 1997) .
The first one, devolution, is a process by which a central government transfers some authority to subnational governments, including the ability to raise taxes and formulate expenditure budgets. Delegation is a process by which a central government transfers a responsibility to subnational governments, remaining responsible for the service and keeping the authority to revoke this transfer at any time. At the end of the spectrum, there is deconcentration, where the central government gives responsibilities for certain services to regional branch offices. It does not require any participation of subnational governments. Each process involves a different level of fiscal autonomy.
The conceptual framework of fiscal decentralization is well established, drawing largely on contributions by Tiebout (1956) , Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972) . In a decentralized state, mobility of citizens, voting power and competition among local governments ensure the matching of local public services production with preferences of citizens and enhance efficiency (Tiebout, 1956) . Also, Oates (1972) argues that in a world with little externalities and heterogeneous tastes, local governments are best suited to provide local public services because they can better adapt to differences in tastes and because they have an information advantage on tastes over central government. This can be referred to as Oates' decentralization theorem. An efficient allocation of local public services means that subnational governments provide services up to the point at which the value placed on the last unit of services for which citizens are willing to pay is just equal to its benefits. This implies that subnational governments must be free to levy "own-source" revenues to match citizens' preferences on expenditures. It then suggests a relation between efficiency and fiscal autonomy (at the margin).
It must be noted however that no convincing empirical evidence exists on the efficiency gain from decentralization. Most of the discussion about fiscal decentralization is theoretical and refers to anecdotal evidence from a few studies (Bardhan, 2002; and Litvack, 1998) . These studies suggest generally positive effects of decentralization, but it is hard to draw any conclusive lessons.
Empirical work
Economic growth. It is expected that if decentralization brings more efficiency in the allocation of public services, it should also bring economic growth. Indeed, most measures of fiscal decentralization using subnational governments' share of revenue or expenditure are positively correlated with the level of economic development measured by per capita income (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 1997) . This means that fiscal decentralization is either a superior good or otherwise helps economic development. In the second case, a positive relation between decentralization and economic growth should exist. This is not however what Davoodi and Zou (1998) find. Using spending share net of intergovernmental transfers as the measure for decentralization, they find a negative relationship with economic growth for developing countries, and no relationship at all for developed countries.
Davoodi and Zou's work is critiqued by Akai and Sakata (2002) for the cultural bias of their data set. According to Akai and Sakata, using data in which the cultural, historical, and institutional differences between countries are substantial makes it difficult to determine the true effect of fiscal decentralization unless adjustments are made to the data in order to account for these differences (this idea is also defended by Bird and Vaillancourt, 1998) . To control the cultural and historical bias, Akai and Sakata use data for one country (the 50 states of the United State) and find that decentralization of government contributed to the states' economic growth.
Public sector size. The relation between fiscal decentralization and the public sector size relies on the theory of the Leviathan State elaborated by Brennan and Buchanan (1980) . Brennan and Buchanan model the government as a monolithic entity that systematically seeks to maximize its total revenue. According to them, the capacity of government to maximize its revenue is only limited by constitutional constraints, among which is decentralization. Citizen mobility and competition between subnational governments will limit their tax pricing power and encourage more efficient allocation of public services.
Consequently, other things being equal, the state should be smaller the more it is decentralized.
The theory of the Leviathan State has limited empirical support. Oates (1985) conducted a study on this relationship using subnational governments' share of revenue and expenditure as proxies for decentralization. He finds no empirical support for the Leviathan hypothesis. Ehdaie (1994) pointes out a weakness in the Oates (1985) study, arguing that taxing and spending decisions should not be taken separately in the decentralization process. Computing measures of fiscal decentralization and fiscal collusion, he finds that decentralization of taxing power has a negative correlation with the public sector size, while the amount of transfers has no significant correlation. More recently, Jin and Zou (2002) , adding the time series dimension to cross-section analysis, find that expenditure decentralization leads to a larger state, while revenue decentralization leads to a smaller state, and finally that vertical imbalances increase the size of the public sector.
Measurement problem.
Most of previous studies use GFS data to compute indicators of fiscal decentralization. Most decentralization measures computed with GFS data are defined on the basis of a single aspect of decentralization that is subnational share of aggregate government revenue or expenditure. This gives a limited representation of fiscal decentralization. It does not take into account the subnational governments' control over tax bases or rates. Ebel and Yilmaz (2002) use new information from OECD (2001) to estimate models with different degrees of subnational governments' revenue autonomy. From the most decentralized to the most centralized, elements of fiscal revenue used were tax autonomy, non-tax autonomy, fiscal dependency and tax sharing (see Table A -1 for details). They reproduce the model of Davoodi and Zou, on decentralization and growth, using their own measures of decentralization and find that tax autonomy and non-tax autonomy have a positive correlation with economic growth, while tax sharing has a negative one. Since in most developing economies tax sharing and grants are the main instruments of decentralization, this may explain the findings of Davoodi and Zou (1998) . These results of Ebel and Yilmaz suggest that the level of subnational governments' control over their revenues can influence economic performance. Ebel and Yilmaz (2002) also replicate the model of Oates with their own indicators of decentralization. They find that fiscal autonomy lead to a smaller state while fiscal dependency and tax sharing had no significant impact. They also find that non-tax autonomy had a positive impact on the public sector size, which makes the interpretation of their results difficult. It should be mentioned though that the transition economies included in their analysis had gone through a major restructuring in the past decade (Bird and Banta, 1999) , which can explain in part their mixed results.
In the Ebel and Yilmaz study, no variable of total decentralization has been computed.
Ratios of different subnational revenue sources over total revenue are the only independent variables. Also, no attention has been given to the size of subnational governments. The subnational share of government revenue or expenditure is not part of any measure, leaving aside this important aspect of fiscal decentralization.
II -Econometric models and data sources
The OECD data on government finance Table 1 provides more details. Like GFS data, OECD identifies three main sources of subnational revenues: tax revenues, non-tax revenues and intergovernmental grants. However the OECD data provide additional information on tax revenues that allows further subdivisions into "own tax revenue" and "tax sharing". The first represents the portion of subnational tax revenue on which subnational governments have significant control (over rates and/or bases). The other, tax sharing, represents the portion on which subnational governments have no significant control. The main source of own tax revenue for the sample used here is taxes on property, while the main source of tax sharing is taxes on income, profits and capital gains. non-tax revenues from OECD surveys include income from business operations, property, administrative fees, duties, and fines. Usually, non-tax revenues are considered as fully controlled by subnational governments. However central government can set some prices for local services or administrative fees. In the liberal interpretation given here to the revenue autonomy, non- tax revenue will always be considered as own source revenue. Finally, more detailed information about intergovernmental grants is also given in OECD data, allowing their subdivision as either general-purpose or specific grants. General-purpose grants are ones that can be seen as own revenue when they are provided based on objective criteria. But their allocation may as well be made at the central government's discretion. Specific grants are earmarked for certain purposes. Their allocation may be conditional across subnational governments as well as unconditional, which gives more autonomy.
A comparison presented in Table 2 of the GFS and OECD aggregate data for subnational share of government expenditure and revenue shows little differences. However, a more detailed analysis shown in Table 3 of OECD data reveals that in most countries, subnational governments do not have a significant control over their revenues. On average for this sample, about 50 % of subnational governments revenues came from tax sharing in 1999. This share ranges from 14% for Poland to 91% for Lithuania. (2002), "we risk the overestimation bias and include general-purpose grants with objective criteria and non-conditional specific grants in the decentralization variable". The main argument is that subnational governments have at least expenditure autonomy over these grants. This transformation pushes the average subnational governments' revenue autonomy from barely 25 % up to 37 % for the whole sample in 1999. In Bulgaria and Poland, where subnational governments received nearly 30 % of their own revenues from such grants, the change is major.
However, even with this liberal interpretation, the measure of decentralization suggested here is obviously different than the ones based on GFS. In every case, the degree of subnational governments' fiscal autonomy is far from 100 %. 
New measures of decentralization
In order to estimate the effects of decentralization it is important to find a good measure for it. Ebel and Yilmaz have shown that expenditure or revenue share were not reliable measures of decentralization because they did not take any consideration of subnational governments' control over their revenues. The new indicators they proposed were interesting in the way that they illustrated which element of decentralization had positive or negative effect on economic outcomes. However, they revealed nothing about the effects of overall decentralization.
To fill this gap, three new measures of decentralization are proposed in this paper. The first one, called "revenue autonomy", is the ratio of subnational governments own source revenue over its total revenue. Own source revenue is defined in the previous section of this text. It is the sum of tax autonomy, non-tax autonomy and intergovernmental grants considered as own revenue (Table 4) . This new variable is illustrated in the upper part of One answer to this question is to use a measure of decentralization that takes into consideration the interaction between the relative size of subnational governments and their fiscal autonomy. Such a measure will be computed here as the "own revenue ratio".
It is the ratio of subnational governments' own revenue, to aggregate government revenue. Opposed to this, we can also easily compute the "dependent revenue ratio", which is the ratio of subnational governments revenue controlled by central government, to aggregate government revenue. These measures are illustrated as shares (black/white areas of bar graphs) of the revenue shares in Figure 2 .
The models

This paper replicates:
The models of Davoodi and Zou, and Oates using their original variables. This heteroskedasticity is too costly in degree of freedom to be estimated (adding 10 more coefficients to estimate). The solution to this has been to ignore panel heteroskedasticity and to consider instead the sample as equivalent to a 30 observations cross-section heteroskedastic sample when using feasible GLS.
All the variables used in regressions are summarized in θ . In this model, only countries fixed effects ( i α ) will be considered. Joint F-test on fixed effects reveals that time dummy coefficients are not significant, while country dummies are significant. The set of control variables ( it X ) will be the same as in the original study, including urban population ratio, GDP per capita and total population.
Because the dependent variable in this model is computed from the OECD data, which are available for only three-year period, it is impossible to use three-year moving averages to smoothen for short-term effects. It must be notice dough that no average data was used in the Oates study. It was a cross-section analysis over only one-year data.
Every model is estimated with each indicator of decentralization, once in a multiple regression including control variables, and once again in a simple regression.
* A three-year moving average is a process by which data t X is replaced by 3 / ) ( Table 5 reports estimation results of the Davoodi and Zou model. Sign and significance of coefficients of all decentralization variables are summarized in Table 6 to facilitate the analysis. The first thing that can be noticed is that no significant relation is found between spending ratio net of grants and economic growth (Panel A of Table 5 ). This is similar to the findings of Davoodi and Zou (1998) for industrial countries, but different from developing countries. This could be explained by the fact that countries in the sample share some key characteristics with developed economies. effects, the tax sharing coefficient looses its significance. Non-tax revenue still has a positive and significant coefficient and fiscal dependency now gets a negative and significant one (see also Table 6 ). 
III -Results and analysis
Economic growth
Subnational tax autonomy The most interesting results here are the one presented in Panel B of Table 5 . Estimation results of multiple regressions, on the left side, show a positive and significant coefficient for the subnational revenue autonomy variable and no significant coefficient for the two other variables. This implies that, even if subnational share of governments' revenue has no significant impact on economic growth, the composition of revenue has a significant impact on it. Other things being equal, economies with a higher level of subnational governments' fiscal autonomy tend to grow faster. Also, simple regressions results presented on the right side of Panel B suggest a positive and significant relation between subnational own revenue ratio and economic growth, and a negative and significant relation for the subnational dependent revenue ratio (see also Table 6 ). This confirms the importance of subnational governments' fiscal autonomy. Decentralization of fiscal power to subnational governments seems to improve economic performance, while decentralization of expenditures coming with centrally controlled revenues seems to be an obstruction to economic growth.
The coefficients of the control variables of the Davoodi and Zou model reported in Table   5 show similarities with the original study. Economies with smaller GNI per capita and smaller population growth tend to grow faster. Higher investment share of GDP brings higher economic growth. School enrolment has the wrong (negative) sign, but is never significant. P-values of joint significance test for the set of control variables are sometimes high (over 5 %). This is an indication of the weakness of the model. The small size of the sample might be part of the explanation. Oates decentralization variables appear in the first two lines of Panel A (Table 7) . It shows a significant and positive relation between decentralization, measured as subnational share of government revenue and expenditure, and the public sector size.
Public sector size
According to the theory of the Leviathan State, this relation should be negative. Results presented in Panel A of Table 7 are similar to the ones of the original study: there is no evidence of the Leviathan State theory. Urban population ratio (Table 7) . Everything else being constant, higher urbanization and higher population seem to bring smaller aggregate public sector size. The GDP per capita coefficient was expected to be positive, but is not significant here. The p-value of joint significance test for control variables is over 5 % for only one estimation. Overall, the
Oates model seems to work well enough.
Conclusion
As already mentioned, a multidimensional process like decentralization is difficult to define and measure. In empirical study, the measurement problem is crucial, since it may be far-reaching in policy design. This paper has presented an empirical analysis on the importance of considering subnational governments' fiscal autonomy when measuring decentralization. In the past, good data were unavailable to conduct such analysis. Empirical results on the relation between decentralization and economic growth lead to two conclusions. First, the subnational share of governments' expenditure does not seem to be related to economic growth in European transition countries. Second, the degree of revenue autonomy of subnational governments does seem to be positively related to growth.
Even if less convincing, empirical results on the relation between decentralization and public sector size seem to point in the same direction. No negative relation seems to exist between decentralization and public sector size for European transition economies.
However, a negative relation is observed between fiscal autonomy of subnational governments and public sector size. This relation disappears in the multiple regression analysis, but it at least suggests that public sector size could be influenced by fiscal autonomy.
The collection of more data on fiscal design across levels of governments should be a major goal for future work on decentralization. In this paper, the small size of the sample restricts the validity of results that are not wrong but are not strong. Better data will bring better empirical analysis on decentralization. It will help to understand this ongoing process that already affects most developing and transition economies. 
